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Beginning in 1970, the federal government seized the envi-
ronmental issue from the states, set an obligatory regulatory agenda 
down to the farm and septic tank level, and harnessed the states to 
do the federal bidding. In the process, governors, mayors, state 
legislators, and town council members lost the power to resolve 
even the most local of environmental issues. These state and lo-
cal officials must follow instructions that come down from on high 
in Washington instead of responding to the wishes of the voters 
who elected them, the people most directly concerned. 
Local pollution sources are, by and large, the ones having the 
greatest effect on our home environments. Responding to these 
local pollution problems accounts for most of the money we spend 
on pollution control - either directly by paying higher taxes and 
higher prices or indirectly by receiving smaller incomes as regula-
tion dampens economic growth. With our home environments and 
our home economies at stake, it is terribly important that these 
local environmental problems be solved adequately and sensibly. 
The federal instructions evolve through the complex interplay 
between members of Congress, their staffs, the president, the vice 
president, the staffs of the White House and the surrounding presi-
dential and vice presidential complexes, the political appointees at 
the top of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the agency's 
18,000 permanent employees, and the other centers of power in 
Washington. Those most concerned with federal environmental 
regulations include businesses that must control emissions or 
whose products may have environmental impacts, businesses that 
sell pollution control services, "public interest groups," and even 
the bypassed state and local officials. It would be naive to suppose 
that any of this cast of characters is immune to the temptation of 
putting self-interest above principle. If we are to have any faith in 
the federal instructions, it is not because only the virtuous have a 
hand in their writing. 
No elected official is directly responsible to local voters for fed-
eral regulations. Congress and the president enact idealistic but 
detailed statutes that deflect the hard choices. Regulations are 
handed down later on the EPA's letterhead. Only after the EPA ap-
plies them in local cases does anyone know what pollution control 
strategies must be implemented, what forms must be filled out, 
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and what permissions must be secured. By that time, members of 
Congress and the president are so far up the chain of command 
that they escape political responsibility. Thus, an unaccountable 
elite - a federal environmental aristocracy - holds the reins of 
power in resolving local environmental issues. The upshot is that 
voters have no meaningful control over how the federal govern-
ment dictates the solution to the environmental problems in their 
own back yards. Perhaps that is why the public, in opinion polls, 
supports shifting power over environmental protection from Wash-
ington to the states and cities.2 
An unaccountable elite - a federal environmental 
aristocracy - holds the reins of power in resolving 
local environmental issues. 
Even if, by some miracle , all members of that aristocracy were 
driven by only the most altruistic of motives, they would fail to pro-
vide sensible solutions to local environmental issues. The federal 
instructions are meant to apply all across the country. Yet, the 
country is amazingly diverse. There are huge differences between 
the large numbers of local environments, industries, facilities 
within any one industry, and sources emitting pollution at any one 
large facility. The EPA's instructions must apply not just to air 
pollution but also to a dizzying array of other environmental issues. 
The numbers of complex matters that the EPA regulates surpasses 
that taken on by any other governmental organization since the 
Office of Price Administration controlled the prices of all goods dur-
ing World War II . But, EPA control has become far more permanent 
and deals with matters that are far more complicated. According to 
Professor Richard Stewart of New York University School of Law, 
"the system has grown to the point where it amounts to nothing 
less than a massive effort at Soviet-style planning of the economy 
to achieve environmental goals."3 No organization could hope to 
deal sensibly with such complexity. As a result, the federal take-
over of environmental law imposes vast waste and needless regu-
la tory complication, yet sometimes fails to clean up local 
environmental problems expeditiously. 
This study argues that the popular desire for a clean environ-
ment can be realized with far more common sense by returning 
control of local environmental issues to state and local government. 
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The EPA would still have a job to do, but it would be limited to fed-
eral business . 
Why Washington Has Control 
The late sixties and early seventies were a time of panic, not 
just about the environment, but also Vietnam, urban riots , and the 
ability of government at any level to respond to human needs. The 
desperate times produced martial measures. The response to Viet-
nam was war, the response to poverty was called a "war," and the 
response to pollution was sufficiently warlike that national politi-
cians could boast that they had assured victory as soon as Con-
gress enacted statutes. 
A federal chain of command was established in which Con-
gress gives instructions to the EPA about how it should give in-
structions to the states about how they should deal with all 
environmental problems. The statutes and regulations purport to 
take account of every conceivable contingency. They also order 
the states to submit back up the chain of command plans and re-
ports, in minute detail , on what they will do and have done to carry 
out the national battle plan. Not for nothing is this called "com-
mand and control" regulation. 
After Congress enacted a host of federal statutes in the 1970s, 
environmental quality improved and the panic ebbed. From this, 
many people concluded that the federal government must continue 
to control environment issues. But, why should this be so? Three 
reasons are usually given: (1) only the federal government can deal 
with interstate pollution; (2) the states can't deal with pollution 
because they are competing to attract employers; and (3) the states' 
record before 1970 showed that they are ineffective at controlling 
pollution. None of these reasons survives careful scrutiny. 
Interstate Pollution 
One rationale for nationalizing pollution control is that pollu-
tion crosses state boundaries. It is true that states may fail to set 
reasonable standards for interstate pollution because state officials 
feel no political pressure to take account of the harm that their 
own constituents do to people living in other states. But, a pollu-
tion source that hurts those in other states usually causes even 
more hurt locally. So, states have adequate incentive to regulate 
most pollution sources. Concerns about interstate pollution justify 
a federal role only in regulating the exceptions. 
Moreover, the federal government itself has systematically 
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